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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will concern itself with a discussion of the implications
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution
as they relate to the right to counsel in Selective Service Proceedings,
and the important question of whether conscientious objection is a con-
stitutional right protected by the freedom of religion 'clauses of the
First Amendment. Subsidiary consideration will also be given to other
aspects of due process.
*J. D., Marquette University Law School (1961) ; Attorney at Law, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Michael O'Melia, J.D., Marquette University Law School (1968),
aided in the preparation of this article.
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In form, the article will first consider the historical aspects of the
problem, discussing and analyzing the cases and regulations which
have, for some time, supported the position that there is no right to
counsel in Selective Service Proceedings, and will then conclude with
suggestions about how the Fifth and Sixth Amendments can be brought
to bear on the question.
The major portion of the article will be concerned with some as-
sumptions that are generally believed to adequately resolve the First
Amendment implications of conscientious objection. Discussion and
analysis of these assumptions will, perhaps, lead to the conclusion that
they are inadequate, and it is to be hoped that the author's final sugges-
tions will resolve this difficult question in a manner commensurate with
our country's constitutional traditions.
II. SELECTIVE SERVICE-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. REASONS FOR DENIAL
Traditionally, no registrant appearing before his local board has
been permitted representation by counsel. In addition to regulations'
which specifically prohibit legal counsel at proceedings before selective
service boards, a number of cases apparently stand for the proposition
that registrants' rights do not include the right to counsel. For purposes
of analysis the decisions can be divided into three categories. In the
first, the courts deny a registrant's right to counsel by terming proceed-
ings before draft boards "nonjudicial." In the second, they use what
might be termed as the "expediency argument." The third is limited to
the United States Supreme Court's position. For purposes of clarity
and coherence, this article will first list the cases in each category and
briefly describe the holding of the court. Analysis, discussion and criti-
cism will be reserved for a later section of the article.
1. Nonjudicial Proceedings
The case of United States v. Pitt2 is particularly important regard-
ing the right-to-counsel question because later court decisions generally
refer to it. The Court of Appeals in Pitt held that denial of the right to
counsel did not deny the defendant due process because the proceedings
were not judicial in nature. Although the case will be fully discussed
later, it should be noted at this point that the defendant did not raise
the issue that denial of counsel violated his constitutional rights, and
therefore, at least in this respect, the holding is dictum.
United States v. Niznik3 held that selective service hearings were
not judicial trials, and therefore the Constitution did not require that
registrants be represented by counsel. Similarly in United States v.
Sturgis' the court noted that in proceedings before the Board the
132 C.F.R. § 1624-1(b) (1968).
2 100 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1944).
3 173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1949).
4342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1965).
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registrant was neither a suspect nor an accused, and that the pro-
ceedings themselves were nonjudicial and noncriminal. The court de-
cided that extending the right to counsel to include administrative pro-
ceedings would be "an unwarranted extension of an individual's right
to counsel." 5 Both cases cite only United States v. Pitt as authority for
that position.
United States v. Capson,6 held that classification for military service
is not penal in character and a registrant has no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. However, the court relied heavily on the fact that the
registrant had been referred by his board to an appeal agent who was
charged with a statutory responsibility to advise registrants.7 In addi-
tion, the court considered the question only under the Sixth Amendment
and did not discuss the applicability of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
2. Inexpediency
In Harris v. Roth," the court held that representation by counsel
would impede the functioning of the selective service boards and in-
hibit the rapid supply of manpower necessary for national defense.
The court noted that local boards are not courts where witnesses are
heard and lawyers represent defendants.
Lehr v. United States9 held it would be impossible for local boards
to suspend activity and have a normal trial under established rules of
evidence for every registrant who objected to performance of his duty
under selective service laws.
3. Position of the United States Supreme Court
On a number of occasions, federal courts have cited the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Cox v. United States ° to bolster
their position that the constitutional right to counsel does not extend
to selective service proceedings. But Cox merely affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction without majority concurrence in the grounds for
the opinion. The decision was based only on the extent of judicial
review and was concurred in by Justices Reed, Vincent, Jackson and
Burton with Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissenting.
The pivotal vote was cast by Justice Frankfurter who concurred in the
result but did not join in any opinion. At best the case is dubious
authority for the proposition that a registrant is not entitled to counsel.
B.. ANALYSIS oF DECISIONS
1. Inadequate Consideration
Decisions as significant as those denying a registrant's right to
counsel should be made only after a complete analysis of the issues.
5 Id. at 332.
6 347 F2d 959 (10th Cir. 1939).
7Id. at 963.
8 146 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1944).
9 139 F.2d 919 (Sth Cir. 1943).
10 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
19o8]
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Examination of the cases commencing with United States v. Pitt, upon
which most of the other cases are based, fails to reveal such careful
analysis. The holding in Pitt is mere dictum, for the court admitted
that the registrant did not raise the question of lack of counsel, implying
therefore the absence of adequate briefs and argument.
The question of constitutional guarantee of full legal representation
in selective service proceedings has never been squarely considered by
the United States Supreme Court, although, despite the above com-
ments, Cox is sometimes, cited in support of the status quo.
United States v. Niznik relied on Pitt and Cox and concludes that
selective service board hearings are nonjudicial, while United States v.
Capson ignores the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment,
considering only Sixth Amendment provisions, feeling that the presence
of an appeal agent with a statutory responsibility to advise registrants
eliminates any prejudice resulting from lack of counsel.
2. Labeling of Proceedings
Cases reasoning that selective service proceedings are neither judi-
cial nor criminal and, therefore, that legal representation is not neces-
sary, hold to an artificial distinction that makes the rights of registrants
depend on the terminology used to describe the proceedings. The court
said in Ex Parte Chin Lay You:" "To make the defendant's substantial
rights in a matter involving personal liberty depend upon whether the
proceeding be called 'criminal' or 'civil' seems to me unsound. 1 " In
light of recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court
and its expansive interpretation of the right to counsel in such cases as
Escobedo v. Illinois'3 and JM1iranda v. Arizona14 it is unlikely -that the
present Court would uphold this distinction.
The right to counsel in proceedings of great seriousness was also
considered by the Supreme Court in In re Gault'5 and Mempa v.
Ray.' 6 In the former, the Court said the availability of constitutional
rights is not dependent upon the type of proceedings 1" and pointed out
that they may be claimed in civil or administrative proceedings. Scorn-
ing as artificial a distinction based on the fact that juvenile proceedings
do not lead to "criminal involvement," the Court pointed out that:
"To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the
feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been
attached to juvenile proceedings.' 8 Mempa may be even more perti-
nent because the Court specified that the stage at which the right to
11223 F. 833 (D. Mass. 1915).
12Id. at 838.
is378 U.S. 378 (1964).
14 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16 389 U.S. 128 (1968).
1 387 U.S. 1, 47-50 (1967).
18 Id. at 49-50.
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counsel commences is that where legal rights may be lost if not exer-
cised.19 This statement bears on the Selective Service System because
of the waiver of defenses which results from failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. The Court held that whether a proceeding is
labeled revocation of probation or deferred sentencing, it is a stage of
criminal proceeding where ,counsel is required.
3. Expediency Argur -ent
The argument that representation by counsel will impede the func-
tioning of the Selective Service System and prevent its effective use
for national defense 0 is based on expediency. It would seem to carry
little weight, at least since Escobedo v. Illinois2 where Mr. Justice
Goldberg, writing for the majority, stated:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no sys-
tem of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to de-
pend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is per-
mitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.22
The belief that allowing registrants to be represented by counsel
will cause intolerable delay is based on the assumption that those
registrants will seek administrative review more regularly, thereby dis-
rupting the process of selecting manpower for the Armed Forces.
Even aside from its basic flaw in assuming that potential difficulties
in implementation can frustrate recognition of constitutional rights,
this argument is not persuasive, for as long as appeal within the
Selective Service System is a matter of right, any registrant can press
a nonmeritorious appeal to delay his induction. It should be recognized
that any system which chooses some and not others will undoubtedly
be attacked by those who feel their selection was unfair. More formal
procedures and representation by counsel may be only a neutral factor.
The affluent and intelligent can generally protect their rights under
the present system. Change would bring us closer to the ideal of equal
justice for all.
There is some evidence indicating that a few local boards allow the
presence of counsel during hearings without any noticeable burden on
the 'system.23
19 Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1968).
20 Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947) ; Ex Parte Chin Lay You, 223 F.
833 (D. Mass. 1915).
21378 U.S. 478 (1964).
221d. at 490.
23 See Comment, Fairness And Due Process Under The Selective Service System,
114 U. PA. L. Rav. 1014, 1034, (1966) (regarding boards in the Detroit area).
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We should also recognize that nothing breeds greater disrespect
for legal procedures than lack of an ascertainable standard by which
a person is judged. After a series of interviews, Charles W. Wilson in
The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,24
concluded that the number of student-deferment appeals would be ap-
preciably reduced after the adoption of clear regulations restricting
discretion of local boards. Representation by counsel would have the
same effect, since the rule of law is generally more satisfactory than
the rule of men, and presence of counsel at the selective service board
proceedings will ensure adherence to the rules established by the
United States Congress.
4. Accountability
Attorney Ben Margolis recounts experiences leading to at least
some suspicion of the fairness with which boards operate in the absence
of legal representation for registrants.2 5 He writes that at a trial he
subpoenaed the minutes of the defendant's local board with the result
that:
We found a very interesting thing: the draft board had sat six
and a half hours, and in that period had considered more than
645 cases. We also established that two cases had involved
conscientious objector hearings, each of which had taken about
an hour. So that in four and a half hours, they had considered
643 cases, one of which was our client's.
2 6
Perhaps even more surprising is the result of his actions pertaining
to defendant's appeal board.
We subpoenaed the Minutes of the appeal board and learned
that the appeal board sat for two hours, in which time it decided
867 cases, one every ten or eleven seconds. They didn't take a
deep breath. They didn't leave the room-they all had good
kidneys. One every ten or eleven seconds.2 7
The results of Attorney Margolis' actions contrast sharply with
regulations which require a de novo consideration of a registrants file
by the appeal board.2 8
An invitation has been extended by the Honorable James Doyle,29
when, agreeing with the defendant's motion that the "constitutional im-
plications of the closed circuit" 30 should be re-evaluated, he suggested the
proper procedure was not a motion, but a full trial. He proposed three
alternatives: first, no change in the system; second, right to counsel
during selective service proceedings; third, relaxing the degree of
2454 CALF. L. Rav. 2123, 2174-5 (1966).
25 Margolis, Trying A Case Under The Selective Service Law, 26 GUILD PRACTI-
TIONER 101 (1967).
26 Id. at 103.27 Id. at 104.
28 32 C.F.R. § 1626.26(a) (1968).
29 United States v. Wierzchucki, 248 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
30 Id. at 790.
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"finality" of Selective Service Boards' decisions. The "closed circuit"
Doyle refers to is the virtual certainty of criminal conviction on a
record made during administrative proceedings where counsel was not
present, followed by judicial review so narrow that it becomes a mere
hollow right. For an appellate decision acknowledging the certainty of
conviction, see United States v. Freeman.31
Allowing, and, if necessary, providing legal representation would
give some credence to the assumption that registrants know their rights
and insure that the encounter between the registrant and his local board
is a confrontation of equals. Under the present system, the registrant
is in no position to demand procedural fairness or the classification to
which he is entitled. He must depend on the good will of his board
for equitable treatment and proper classification.
The persuasiveness of any contention that registrants do not need
counsel is diminished by the practice of the local board, for the boards
themselves have counsel available and consult with their attorneys
before taking action.
The assertion that innocent persons do not need lawyers is far
from the truth. In reality, the so-called plain, unvarnished truth is
nothing but an abstraction which, until after the fact, exists only in
man's imagination and even then must, in the mind of any honest person,
always be accompanied by at least a suspicion that things may not
have been as they seemed. A case containing judicial acknowledgement
that important facts bearing on the ultimate outcome were not presented
due to absence of counsel is United States v. Zimmerman.32
5. Conclusion
If constitutional guarantees require that registrants be represented
by counsel, a decision is required as to the stage of the proceedings at
which this right will be implemented.
Several possibilities exist:
1. At all times.
2. When a registrant is dissatisfied with his classification.
3. At his personal appearance.
4. When advised of his appeal rights.
5. When his freedom is in jeopardy.
The difficulties thus presented and the relative appropriateness of
the various alternatives are beyond the scope of this article. It is enough
to say that the obstacles do not seem insurmountable, especially when
compared with the difficulties that ensued from such decisions as
Gideon v. Wainuright,3 3 Miranda v. Arizona,3 4 and In re Gault.35
31388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
32 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
33 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19681
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
C. APPLICABLE REGULATIONS PROHIBITING COUNSEL
Although some of the preceding discussion applies to the validity
of administrative regulations prohibiting representation by counsel in
selective service proceedings, some separate consideration of a regu-
lation 36 is necessary.
Regulations forbidding legal representation before an agency must
be measured by the same constitutional standard as would a similar
enactment prohibiting counsel during trial. It is a function of the courts,
not the legislative or executive branches, to determine finally what is
and what is not required by the Constitution. The legislative process
must be implemented in accord with judicially determined constitutional
principles. If the Bill of Rights requires counsel, no regulation or statute
can change it. Neither regulation nor statute could have changed the
result of Gideon, Escobedo, or Miranda. This rule was clearly ex-
pounded in the concurring opinion of Justice Murphy in Estep v.
United States.3"
A court having jurisdiction to try such a case has a clear, in-
herent duty to inquire into these matters so that constitutional
rights are not impaired or destroyed. Congress lacks any
authority to negative this duty or to command the court to
exercise criminal jurisdiction without regard to the due process
of law or other individual rights. To hold otherwise is to sub-
stitute illegal administrative discretion for constitutional safe-
guards. As this Court has previously said, 'Under our system
there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a
competent court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrange-
ment designed to give effect to administrative action going be-
yond the limits of constitutional authority.' St. Joseph's Stock
Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 52.38
This reasoning was confirmed in Miranda, when the Court pointed
out: "IT]he issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must
be determined by the courts. . . .Where rights secured by the Con-
stitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which
would abrogate them." 39
Denial of counsel at administrative proceedings is not standard pro-
cedure. Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that
any person compelled to appear before any agency shall be accorded
the right to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel. This
establishes a standard which should be departed from only for sound
reasons.
D. SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment guarantees must be carefully considered
3632 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1968).
37 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
38 Id. at 127.
39 384 U.S. 436, 490-491 (1966).
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because judicial review is limited, and it is clear that at least since, if
not prior to, Powell v. Alabama 0 the constitutionally guaranteed right
to counsel requires effective representation:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. He is incapable of determining
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. He lacks both the skill and knowledge to
adequately prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true it is of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect.41 (emphasis added)
Provision for counsel at trial alone does not adequately discharge
Sixth Amendment protections, particularly in selective service cases
where the issue is whether defendant submitted to induction, and
judicial review is limited to the board's failure to afford due process.
The contrary assertion is further weakened by the realization that the
latter defense can be unwittingly waived if the defendant fails to ex-
haust his administrative remedies.
Various constitutional guarantees must be available at pretrial stages
to insure effective protection of the defendant's rights at trial. A
registrant's rights should be assured unless knowingly and intelligently
waived following advice of counsel. judicial review does not obviate
the necessity of representation by counsel before the board any more
than the right of appeal eliminates the need for counsel during trial.
The blunt words quoted in Escobedo strongly express the im-
portance of counsel during pretrial proceedings. "One can imagine a
cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let him have the most illustrious counsel
now. They can't escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can
do for them at the trial.' "142
Discussion of the extent to which the right to effective representa-
tion at trial requires the presence of counsel at administrative pro-
ceedings is inevitably flavored by the dissent in In re Groban,43 a case
involving a state fire marshall. The dissenting opinion, authored by
Justice Black, and concurred in by Justices Warren, Douglas, and
Brennan, gives an indication of the position the Court might take if
it were confronted with this question again. While the dissenting opinion
acknowledges that no one would suggest that a defendant does not need
40 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
41 Id. at 68-69.
42 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964). The quote is from Ex Parte
Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-518 (D. Utah 1952).
43 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
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counsel at trial, it went further, inserting that: "The right to use
counsel at a formal trial is a very hollow thing when, for all practical
purposes, the conviction is already assured by a pretrial examination." '4 4
The majority opinion based its position that there is no right to counsel
in an administrative investigation on three lower Federal Court de-
cisions. The dissent criticized this singular lack of authority, stating:
"Heretofore this Court has never held and I would never agree that
an administrative agency conducting an investigation could validly
compel a witness to appear before it and testify in secret without the
assistance of his counsel.
'45
The effect of the majority position is weakened because only three
of the five Justices who agreed with the result concurred in the opinion.
The dissent has more weight because it has been approved in subse-
quent majority opinions, with specific reference to the quoted language.46
In a lengthy analysis, the dissent discusses the majority argument that
administrative agencies may exclude counsel and such other persons as
they choose, so their investigatory proceedings will not be unduly en-
cumbered, dismissing it with the statement: "It is undeniable that law
enforcement officers could rack up more convictions if they were not
'hampered' by the defendant's counsel or the presence of others who
might report to the public the manner in which people were being
convicted. 4
7
The importance of counsel at pretrial stages is stressed in Ex parte
Sullivan,48 quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Miranda:
In view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Powell
v. Alabama . . . , to mention but one of the many cases, un-
questionably Petitioners were entitled to have effective counsel
at the trial. The question here is how they ever could have had
effective counsel at the trial, no matter how skilled, in view of
what went on before the trial. They were denied effective
counsel at the trial itself because of what went on before the
trial while the defendants were without counsel, and absolutely
under the control of the prosecution.49
The reasoning can be related to selective service cases by the rea-
soning of Justice Murphy, dissenting in Cox v. United States5°:
This differs from an ordinary civil proceeding to review a non-
punitive order of an administrative agency, an order which is
unrelated to freedom of conscience or religion. This is a criminal
trial. It involves administrative action denying that the defendant
has conscientious or religious scruples against war, or that he
is a minister. His liberty and reputation depend upon the validity
44 Id. at 344.
45 Id. at 348.
46 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47352 U.S. 330, 349.
48107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952).
49 Id. at 517.
50 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
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of the action. If the draft board classification is held valid, he
will be- imprisoned or fined and will be branded as a violator
of the nation's law; if the classification is unlawful, he is a free
man. Moreover, he has had no previous opportunity to secure a
judicial test of this administrative action, no chance to prove
that he was denied his statutory rights.51
Weaknesses of cases generally cited to sustain convictions of regis-
trants despite absence of counsel have already been pointed out. There
is always the danger that courts might become merely administrators
of an ossified "stare decisis," lending contemporary validity to the
comments Jonathan Swift had Lemuel Gulliver give his Master
Houyhnhnm about the English courts of his times, in his satire,
Gulliver's Travels:
It is a Maxim among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been
done before, may legally be done again: And therefore they take
special Care to record all the Decisions formerly made against
common Justice and the general Reason of Mankind. These,
under the name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities to
justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail
to direct accordingly. 52
In language less colorful, but perhaps more persuasive, the United
States Supreme Court in Escobedo quoted the Report of Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal
Criminal Justice, 10-11 (1963) :
The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and cre-
ative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority
at all stages of the process .... Persons [denied access to coun-
sel] are incapable of providing the challenges that are indis-
pensable to satisfactory operation of the system. The loss to the
interests of accused individuals, occasioned by these failures, are
great and apparent. It is also clear that a situation in which
persons are required to contest a serious accusation but are
denied access to the tools of the contest is offensive to fairness
and equity. Beyond these considerations, however, is the fact
that [this situation is] detrimental to the proper functioning of
justice and that the loss of vitality of the adversary system,
thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests of
a free community.53
E. DUE PROCESS
1. Fifth Amendment-Counsel
Perhaps the most serious omission in judicial consideration of the
question of legal representation before selective service boards is a full
exploration of the implications of the Fifth Amendment.
51 Id. at 458.
52 The Fourth Voyage, Ch. V, 275 (Heritage Press, N.Y. 1940) (It might be
pointed out that other parts of this chapter are anything but funny. Swift,
apparently, considered all lawyers and judges to be liars and thieves.)
r3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.13 (1964).
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As early as 1932, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland, specifically acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is also within "the intendment of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. '54 Similarly, Gideon, which overruled Betts v.
Brady55 held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
made the right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment applicable
to the States. Although the Court accepted Betts' assumption "that a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to
a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, '56 it added: "We think the Court in Betts was wrong,
however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of the fundamental rights."5 The Court specifically
noted that Powel5 8 had made "conclusions about the fundamental
nature of the right to counsel" 59 ten years previously. The Court re-
ferred to its 1936 decision in Grossjean v. American Press Co. 60 that
"certain fundamental rights, also safeguarded by the first eight amend-
ments against federal action, were safeguarded against state action by
the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among
them the fundamental right of the accused to aid of counsel in a
criminal prosecution." 1
Escobedo reiterated that the right to counsel was implicit in con-
stitutional guarantees of due process, approving Crooker v. California,"
which held its denial a violation of due process:
... not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the
merits, but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the
pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby
as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of that funda-
mental fairness extended to the very concept of justice.6 3
(emphasis added)
If the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
upon the states all the obligations of the guarantee of counsel and the
multiplicity of circumstances in which it is applicable, it would seem
that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is no less restrictive
in the circumstances in which the presence of counsel is required.
Specht v. Patterson64 is also pertinent. The Court said that commit-
ment proceedings "whether denominated civil or criminal are subject
to both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
54 Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
55 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
56 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
57 Ibid.
58 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
60297 U.S. 233 (1936).
61d. at 243-4.
62357 U.S. 433 (1958).
63 Id. at 439.
64 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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and to the Due Process Clause. '65 A standard applicable to selective
service proceedings was outlined: "Due process, in other words, re-
quires that he be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be
heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to
cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own."66
2. Findings of Fact
Assuming the defendant has exhausted available administrative
remedies, he is entitled to judicial review of his board's decision to
determine whether it had any basis in fact.6 7 In analyzing the record
to determine the validity of the actions of the board "the courts may
properly insist that there be some proof that is incompatible with the
registrant's proof of exemption. '68 The board, according to Mr. Justice
Jackson in a dissenting opinion, may not merely disbelieve the regis-
trant, but must build a record containing affirmative evidence to rebut
his claim for exemption. 69 Board actions are conclusive, however, if
they have some basis in fact.70
Generally, orders of administrative agencies are final and free from
court alteration only if they are within the scope of the agency's
authority and based upon adequate findings which are supported by
substantial evidence. 71
The Court in Dickinson v. United States72 held that the court's duty
is to look for affirmative evidence supporting the board's finding that
a registrant has not told his whole story. As to the local boards the
Court said:
[W]hen the uncontroverted evidence supporting the registrant's
claim places him prima facie within the statutory exemption,
dismissal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and specu-
lation is both contrary to the spirit of the Act and foreign to
our concept of justice.73
In light of this unusually narrow judicial review, selective service
decisions become unassailable unless the reasons for them are clearly
stated. At present, however, there is no indication of facts found or
conclusions drawn. If, for example, a registrant's request for a student
deferrment is denied, the board merely sends a card (Selective Service
65 Id. at 608.
66 Id. at 610.
67 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Gibson v. United States, 329
U.S. 338 (1946).68 See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396 (1953).
69 Id. at 399.
70 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
71Associated Wholesale Grocer, Inc. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 274 (D.
Kansas 1967). See also United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515,
529 (1946); Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 140(1939); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282(1934); J.B. Montgomery, Inc. v. United States 206 F. Supp. 455 (D. Colo.
1964), aff'd., 376 U.S. 389 (1964).
72 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
73 Id. at 397.
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System Form 110) stating that he has been classified 1-A and has a
right to appeal. The registrant is not told which of various possible
deficiencies in his request prompted its denial. As a result he is unable
to address himself with any degree of specificity to the problems with
which he must be concerned on appeal. The appeal board's decisions
are equally unquestionable. If a registrant refuses induction and is
indicted, the judge must examine his entire cover sheet to determine
whether any factual basis existed for the board's classification. The
court is faced with the onerous task of attempting to justify the actions
of the agency rather than examining the record to see if its stated
position is legally valid. Thus the provisions for appeal and judicial
review, even limited as they are, are largely illusory. Serious problems
of due process of law result whenever practices "saddle the reviewing
process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record."74
Applicable requirements of due process are outlined in SpechtT5
where in addition to the rights above referred to the Court held that:
Due process, in other words, requires that he be present with
counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with
witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to
offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate
to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed.7 6
It is argued that a formal fact-finding would unduly burden the
selective service system; however, requiring the members and clerks
of local boards to testify in Federal Court would be a much greater
inconvenience and has been steadfastly opposed.
The importance of findings of fact is implied in United States v.
Jakobson77 where the defendant was convicted of refusing to submit
to induction. In reversing that conviction, the Court of Appeals said it
was unable to determine from the record whether the legal basis for
the defendant's classification was correct or erroneous. The record
revealed two possible grounds upon which the decision of the board
could have rested. Relying on a number of cases"' the court held that
"when a case is submitted to fact finders on two legal theories, one
right and the other wrong, their determination cannot stand."7 9 In the
absence of evidence that the board's decision was based on the valid
rather than the invalid ground, the conviction had to be reversed. If
selective service boards were required to make findings of fact, there
74 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
7 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
76 Id. at 610.
77325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963).
78 Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 345 (1955); United New York & New
Jersey Sandy Hood Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Levi v.
Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Erickson, 149 F. Supp.
476 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Shephard v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.
1954); Upparala v. United States, 219 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1954).
79 United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 416 (2d Cir. 1963).
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could be no doubt about the reasons for the decisions and courts would
not be burdened with the task of justifying them or acquitting the
defendant because unable to determine their basis.
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: CONGRESSIONAL GRANT
OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The final question to be considered in this article is whether that
section of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 pertaining to
conscientious objection is congressional recognition of a First Amend-
ment right or a gracious provision of the legislative arm of the
Federal Government.
Section 6(j) of the Act provides as follows:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subjected to combatant training and service in the
Armed Forces of the United States who by reason of religious
training and belief is conscientiously opposed to the participation
in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term 'reli-
gious training and belief' does not include essentially political,
sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.80
A. TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION AND ITS PROBLEMS
Despite occasional implications to the contrary,8 ' most cases state:
"There is no constitutional right to exemption from military service
because of conscientious objection or religious calling."82 No recent
case discusses in any detail the reasoning which leads to this conclu-
sion. Certainly none contains anything even approaching a full and
fair discussion of this obviously difficult issue. The majority position
which stands for negative resolution of the proposition is based on the
Selective Draft Law Cases 3 with which the following language re-
solved the issue:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition
that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the
free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment re-
sulted from the exemption clauses of the Act to which we at
the outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too
apparent to require us-to do more.8 4
It is submitted that the consideration hardly qualifies as the kind of
analysis which generally precedes decision of serious questions of con-
stitutional law. Hopefully it can be demonstrated in this article that
the First Amendment does require recognition of the right to refuse
service in the armed forces and that the contrary is not as apparent
as the courts seem to believe.
In the final analysis the proposition that conscientious objection is
80 Section 6(j) of Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
81 United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
82 See Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1950).
83 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
84 Id. at 389-390.
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a matter of legislative grace rather than a First Amendment right de-
pends solely on the Selective Draft Law Cases.5 The cases 86 which
stand for the majority position have been overruled,17 a factor which
clearly requires the re-evaluation of the soundness of their reasoning.
They discussed the issue in the context of an alien's willingness to bear
arms in defense of this country, and concluded that the willingness is
a prerequisite for citizenship:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear
arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or
implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with
the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. The alien, when he
becomes a naturalized citizen, acquires, with one exception,
every right possessed under the Constitution by those citizens
who are native born (Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22) ;
but he acquires no more. The privilege of the native-born con-
scientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the
Constitution, but from the Acts of Congress. That body may
grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and
if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot
successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is com-
patible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war powers as
above illustrated, which include, by necessary implication, the
power, in the last extremity, to compel the armed service of any
citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views
in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or
war in general.
8
That argument evidences a belief that there is a constitutional duty
to bear arms which derives from the war power of the federal gov-
ernment. The courts at that time felt that that conclusion was self-
evident and any contention that conscientious objection was a First
Amendment right must fail or introduce a conflict into the Consti-
tution itself.
Reliance today on these cases runs afoul of Girouard v. United
States,9 which expressly overruled Schwinnmer, MacIntosh and Bland,90
destroying the basis of the above argument and undercutting the Selec-
tive Draft Law Cases91 at least insofar as they hold there is no con-
stitutional right to be a conscientious objector. In disposing of the
argument that there was a constitutional duty to bear arms, Girouard
suggested that such a holding would make "an abrupt and radical
85 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
s8 George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Schwinmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1928) ; United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605,
624 (1931) ; United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1930).
87 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
88 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-4 (1931).
89 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
90 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1928); United States v. Mac-
Intosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1930).
91 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
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departure from our traditions,"92 and concluded there were many ways
for a person to support his country, and that: "The fact that his
particular role may be limited by religious convictions has no necessary
bearing on the attachment to his country or on his willingness to
support and defend it to his utmost. ' 9
3
The Girouard case uses language unmistakably relevant to the
dilemma in which the Macintosh Court found itself. Whereas Mac-
Intosh and Schwimmer held that citizens had a constitutional duty to
bear arms which precluded any recognition of a right to be a con-
scientious objector, Girouard decided that no such constitutional re-
quirement exists, and referred to the beliefs of conscientious objectors
in terms that bring the question within the confines of the First Amend-
ment. The decision seems inconsistent with the contention that Congress
has established a privilege when it refers to "Respect over the years
for the conscience of those having religious scruples against bearing
arms"9 4 and "recognition by Congress that even in time of war one
may truly support and defend our institutions though he stops short of
using weapons of war."95 The Court recalled the traditions of this
country which recognize conscientious objection, couching its position
in First Amendment terms:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been
an effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the con-
science of the individual. The victory for freedom of thought
recorded in our Bill of Rights -recognizes that in the domain of
conscience there is moral power higher than the State. Through-
out the ages, men have suffered death rather than subordinate
their allegiance to God to the authority of the State. Freedom
of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product
of that struggle.96 (emphasis added)
The decisions of the United States Courts of Appeal are based on the
above cases and either use the language of the Supreme Court as justi-
fication or cite no authority whatever. If the decisions of the Supreme
Court have fallen, so must those of the Courts of Appeal. It seems,
then, that although the courts appear to believe that conscientious ob-
jection is a matter of legislative grace, the decisions do not adequately
deal with the issue. The question still remains open, and the decisions
may stand for the proposition that conscientious objection is a con-
stitutional right.
To thus preclude consideration of the question, however, is to leave
the matter in an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, if Congress de-
crees that the citizen must bear arms or participate in war regardless
92 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
93M. at 65.
941d. at 66-7.
95 Id. at 67.
96M. at 68.
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of his religious beliefs, clearly it prevents him from practicing his
religion as he believes he must, and at least on the surface conflicts
with the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. On the other
hand, if the Congress attempts to provide for free-exercise of religion
and permits those who "by reason of religious training and belief"
97
are opposed to war to claim exemption from military service on that
ground, it assumes to the Government the right to define which re-
ligious beliefs are sufficiently orthodox to come within the exemption,
thus violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
B. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Perhaps the exit from this dilemma can be found in a careful
reading of United States v. Seeger9" where the Court points out that
at the present time the statute requires, and draft boards must deter-
mine, the existence of two criteria. They being "whether the beliefs
professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in
his own scheme of things, religious." 99 The question of sincerity is, of
course, a question of fact to be determined by local boards subject to
judicial review. It is the other question which raises the constitutional
dilemma. The best resolution may be adoption of a definition of religion
which gives full meaning to the recognition of man's basic dignity
found in the First Amendment to the Constitution. In Seeger the
Court arrived at this result by straining the language of the Military
Training Act to avoid "a serious constitutional doubt."'10 0
As used in the Seeger case: "This construction would avoid imput-
ing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others . . ."01 The Court held that religious train-
ing and belief within the context of the Act include:
[A]l1 sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or
being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated
in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies
in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption. 10 2
The Court asks the rhetorical question: "Does the term 'Supreme
Being' . . . mean orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or
being, or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent' ?-103 This
allows, in the words of the Court, use of a test which is "essentially
an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same piace
97 Section 6(j) of Military Service Act of 1967.
98 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
99 Id. at 185.100 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,47 (1953).
101 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
102 Id. at 176.
103 Id. at 174.
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in the life of the objector as an, orthodox belief in one God-holds in
the life of one clearly qualified for exemption ?-104
The term religion, as used in the First Amendment, it need hardly
be said, is a broader term than theism. The latter concept is much too
narrow to satisfy the diverse demands made on it by the sincere beliefs
of the citizens of the United States. To limit religion to those who be-
lieve in a personal God or in the Judeo-Christian sense is hardly more
valid constitutionally than would be a test limiting the definition to
Roman Catholicism. The test is simply stated by Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in the result: "In sum, I agree with the Court that any
person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which fills in
his life the same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox
religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute."'105 To do other-
wise would be to invite the religious prosecution that Mr. Justice
Jackson refers to in his dissent in United States v. Ballard'" where he
points out that toleration of unorthodox or even ridiculous beliefs is
necessary, and their prosecution "is precisely the thing the Constitution
put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of
religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and
even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."''0 7
Persecution may reach "into wholly dangerous ground,""', and
"discomfort orthodox as well as unconventional religious teachers, for
even the most regular of them are sometimes accused of taking their
orthodoxy with a grain of salt."' 0 9 Finally, Justice Jackson reminds us
that if we are to honor our Constitution, we must "have done this
business of judicially examining other people's faiths."" 0
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent has added weight because the only
point of disagreement between him and the majority was his conclusion
that the defendant's conviction should be reversed, which was con-
trasted with the majority's decision that a remand for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with the opinion was more appropriate.
Certainly he is in agreement with the most important expression of
Mr. Justice Douglas in the majority opinion:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the
fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean
that they can be made suspect before the law."' z
104 Id. at 184.
.05 Id. at 192-3.
106 322 U.S. 78, 92-5 (1943).
107 Id. at 95.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
:10 Ibid.
"' Id. at 86-7.
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